CVE-2017-9392 Information
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An issue was discovered on Vera VeraEdge 1.7.19 and Veralite 1.7.481 devices. The device provides UPnP services that are available on port 3480 and can also be accessed via port 80 using the url \/port_3480. It seems that the UPnP services provide \request_image\ as one of the service actions for a normal user to retrieve an image from a camera that is controlled by the controller. It seems that the \res\ (resolution) parameter passed in the query string is not sanitized and is stored on the stack which allows an attacker to overflow the buffer. The function \LU::Generic_IP_Camera_Manager::REQ_Image\ is activated when the lu_request_image is passed as the \id\ parameter in the query string. This function then calls \LU::Generic_IP_Camera_Manager::GetUrlFromArguments. This function retrieves all the parameters passed in the query string including \res\ and then uses the value passed in it to fill up buffer using the sprintf function. However the function in this case lacks a simple length check and as a result an attacker who is able to send more than 184 characters can easily overflow the values stored on the stack including the $RA value and thus execute code on the device.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Reference
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153242/Veralite-Veraedge-Router-XSS-Command-Injection-CSRF-Traversal.html
https://github.com/ethanhunnt/IoT_vulnerabilities/blob/master/Vera_sec_issues.pdf
https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Jun/8
An
issue
was
discovered
on
Vera
VeraEdge
1.7.19
and
Veralite
1.7.481
devices.
The
device
provides
UPnP
services
that
are
available
on
port
3480
and
can
also
be
accessed
via
port
80
using
the
url
\/port_3480.
It
seems
that
the
UPnP
services
provide
\request_image
as
one
of
the
service
actions
for
a
normal
user
to
retrieve
an
image
from
a
camera
that
is
controlled
by
the
controller.
It
seems
that
the
\res
(resolution)
parameter
passed
in
the
query
string
is
not
sanitized
and
is
stored
on
the
stack
which
allows
an
attacker
to
overflow
the
buffer.
The
function
\LU::Generic_IP_Camera_Manager::REQ_Image
is
activated
when
the
lu_request_image
is
passed
as
the
\id
parameter
in
the
query
string.
This
function
then
calls
\LU::Generic_IP_Camera_Manager::GetUrlFromArguments.
This
function
retrieves
all
the
parameters
passed
in
the
query
string
including
\res
and
then
uses
the
value
passed
in
it
to
fill
up
buffer
using
the
sprintf
function.
However
the
function
in
this
case
lacks
a
simple
length
check
and
as
a
result
an
attacker
who
is
able
to
send
more
than
184
characters
can
easily
overflow
the
values
stored
on
the
stack
including
the
$RA
value
and
thus
execute
code
on
the
device.
Attack Complexity
LOW
Privileges Required
LOW
User Interaction Required
LOW
Scope
NONE
Confidentiality Impact
UNCHANGED
Integrity Impact
HIGH
Availability Impact
HIGH
Base Score
HIGH
Base Severity
8.8